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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WYCOFF COMPANY, INCORPOR-
ATED, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, DON-
ALD HACKING and RAYMOND W. 
GEE, ITS COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
9915 
This is a Declaratory Judgment action that seeks to 
have declared unconstitutional the Utah Motor Carrier Act 
(Chapter 6, Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953) and all 
of the Public Utilities Act (Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 
1953), to the extent that the provisions of the latter act 
relate to the regulation or control of motor carriers, on the 
basis that the provisions and requirements of said Acts, 
and the exemptions provided in Section 54-6-12, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, are repugnant to Article I, Sections 2, 7 
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and 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and Amend-
ment XIV of the Constitution of the United States of Amer-
ica. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Most of the facts pertaining to methods of regulation 
by the Public Service Commission were stipulated. No tes-
timony was taken and the matter was submitted after the 
filing of written briefs and oral argument by counsel. The 
trial court found the issues in favor of respondent, based 
upon the following Conclusions of Law (R. 100): 
"That the exclusion provisions of the statute 
which, as set out in Section 54-6-12, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, exempt from general application of 
the Act and from the jurisdiction of the Public Ser-
vice Commission (except as to requirements of in-
surance, safety regulations and accident reports), 
those motor carriers engaged in transportation for 
non-profit agriculture associations; or those motor 
carriers transporting, for hire, farm, orchard, or 
dairy products; livestock, farm, or dairy supplies 
used on or about farms or dairies; coal, lumber, logs, 
newspapers, money or valuables, are discriminatory 
and deny to those carriers brought within the Act 
in all particulars, the equal protection of the laws 
as guaranteed by Amendments XIV of the Consti-
tution of the United States of America, and Article 
I, Section 7, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah." 
The judgment of the court was as follows (R. 102-
103) : 
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
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as amended, is hereby declared to be in violation of 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United 
States of America and Article I, Section 7, of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, and that said 
Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, is unconstitutional and void." 
The court's attention is directed to the fact that the 
above judgment is limited to declaring Title 54, Chapter 
6 (the 1\Iotor Carrier Act) unconstitutional, and that Title 
64 (the Public Utilities Act), insofar as its provisions re-
late to the regulation of motor carriers, was not declared 
unconstitutional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to vacate the Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment, of the court below, 
and to have this matter reversed in favor of the appellants 
and against respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are limited, as the issue is pri-
marily one of law. 
Respondent is a common motor carrier of property, 
operating in the State of Utah pursuant to various certifi-
cates of convenience and necessity issued by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah (R. 44-45). Since the com-
mencement of this action, respondent has made application 
to the Public Service Commission of Utah for at least one 
additional certificate of convenience and necessity ( R. 86) . 
Respondent alleges in paragraph 7 of its complaint, as 
follows (R. 3) : 
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"That the defendants have threatened to re-
quire plaintiff to pay substantial penalties and have 
caused criminal citations to be issued against plain-
tiff, and plaintiff'ss employees, the proceedings un-
der some of which are still pending, for plaintiff's 
alleged failure to comply with the requirements of 
Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
At the time respondent filed its complaint in this mat-
ter, there was pending before the Supreme Court of Utah 
the case of Wycoff Company, Incorporated v. Public Ser-
vice Commission of Utah, et al., 13 Utah (2d) 123, 369 
Pac. (2d) 283. The decision of the Supreme Court on 
March 1, 1962, affirmed the penalty assessed against re-
spondent by the Public Service Commission in the amount 
of $18,500.00 for violations of the Motor Carrier Act. The 
penalties were imposed pursuant to Sec. 54-7-25, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, part of the Public Utilities Act not the 
Motor Carrier Act. There is presently pending before the 
District Court for Salt Lake County, case, Civil No. 140087, 
State of Utah v. Wycoff Company, Incorporated, which ac-
tion was instituted to recover the aforesaid penalty of $18-
500.00 from Wycoff. A judgment in favor of the State of 
Utah was rendered April 10, 1963. On June 21, 1963, an 
order was issued by said District Court, suspending any 
further proceedings in said case until the constitutionality 
of the Motor Carrier Act is resolved by this court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED TO QUESTION 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH 
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l\IOTOR CARRIER ACT (CHAPTER 6, TITLE 
54, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953). 
Respondent Wycoff has for many years been engaged 
in business as a common motor carrier of property, hold-
ing certificates of convenience and necessity to engage in 
the transportation of property for hire in Utah commerce, 
and during the pendency of this action, has petitioned the 
Public Service Commission of Utah for an enlargement or 
extension of its authority to engage in the transportation of 
property in intrastate commerce (R. 86). During this time, 
respondent has enjoyed the benefits a motor carrier derives 
from being the holder of certificates of convenience and 
necessity and did not choose to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the Utah Motor Carrier Act, or the Public Utilities 
Act, as it pertains to motor carriers, until the filing of this 
action. 
Apparently this action was commenced as a result of 
the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of respondent's 
complaint, which states: "That the defendants have threat-
ened to require Plaintiff to pay substantial penalties and 
have caused criminal citations to be issued against plain-
tiff, and plaintiff's employees, the proceedings under some 
of which are still pending, for plaintiff's alleged failure to 
comply with the requirements of Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953" (R. 3). With respect to the extent 
that respondent was adversely affected by such action, the 
Supreme Court of Utah laid the matter at rest on March 1, 
19l)~. when it decided the case of Wycoff Co., Inc. v. Public 
St'n·ice Commission of Utah, et al., supra, upholding the im-
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position of a penalty of $18,500.00 against the carrier for 
violations of its authority, and sustaining the validity of 
the statutes under which such action was taken. 
The position of appellants is that respondent is es-
topped to question the constitutionality of the Utah Motor 
Carrier Act on the basis that one who retains and enjoys 
the benefits of a law may not attack its constitutionality. 
It is a well recognized rule in constitutional law that 
one who accepts benefits under a statute may be estopped 
from questioning the constitutionality of the statute. This 
principle is stated as follows in the case of Fahey v. Mal-
lonee, 332 U. S. 245, 91 L. Ed 2031: 
"* * * It is an elementary rule of constitu-
tional law that one may not 'retain the benefits of 
the Act while attacking the constitutionality of one 
of its important conditions.' United States v. San 
Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29, 84 L. Ed. 1050, 1059, 
60 S. Ct. 749. As formulated by Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 348, 80 L. Ed. 688, 711, 
56 S. Ct. 466, 'The Court will not pass upon the con-
stitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who 
has availed himself of its benefits.'" 
There are exceptions to the rule, however, and it ap-
pears that the courts are not in complete agreement. The 
situation is described thusly in the summary of a complete 
annotation on this subject in 65 A. L. R. (2d) 664: 
"It is not possible to derive, from the cases 
discussed in this annotation, a flat or uniform rule 
governing the question whether a person is, by ap-
plying for or securing a professional or occu~a­
tional license, precluded from attacking the vahd-
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ity of the licensing law, or any of its parts, or an 
administrative regulation issued thereunder. The 
question ordinarily depends upon the circumstances 
of th(' individual case. 
·•As regards the nature of the proceeding in 
which an attack on the constitutionality of a licens-
ing law, or part thereof, is made, the authorities 
seem in agreement that such an attack cannot be 
made in proceedings to obtain the license, except as 
to specific provisions which prevent the applicant 
from obtaining the license. Most cases hold that a 
person who obtains a license cannot afterward ques-
tion the constitutionality of the licensing law when 
the license is sought to be revoked. But there are 
cases upholding such an attack even in proceedings 
related to revocation. It seems that the rule of es-
toppel or waiver does not apply in a criminal or 
civil proceeding for acting without a license. But 
it cannot be said that in civil actions between pri-
vate parties the rule of waiver or estoppel never 
applies; the rule has been uniformly applied in ac-
tions on a licensee's bond. 
"Apart from the circumstances of individual 
cases, there is a cleavage in the court's fundamental 
approach to the question under annotation. Some of 
the courts, in holding that an attack was not per-
missible, have emphasized that the application for 
the license was the voluntary act of the litigant, 
while other courts, in reaching the opposite result 
as to the permissibility of the attack, have empha-
sized that in view of the penalties prescribed in the 
licensing law for acting without license, the appli-
cation for the license was not the voluntary act of 
the litigant." (Emphasis added.) 
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In 1957 this court had a somewhat analogous situation 
before it in the case of Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake 
City, 6 U. 2d 428, 315 P. 2d 859. To refresh the court's 
memory of the facts of that case, they are summarized in 
the syllabus as follows: "The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., 
held that where transportation company for six years ac-
cepted all terms of ordinance which permitted it to operate 
a mass transportation system by rail, bus, or other systems, 
and required company to pay license tax, company's con-
duct constituted an acceptance of ordinance and company 
could not attack validity of ordinance, even though com-
pany had not filed acceptance within 30 days after ordin-
ance was passed and ordinance provided that failure to file 
would render ordinance null and void." 
In its decision in the Salt Lake City Lines case, this 
court cited with approval the principle set down in Fahey 
v. Mallonee, supra, when it said: 
"All of the contentions mentioned seem to be 
vulnerable to the general proposition that one ac-
cepting the benefits of legislation, ordinarily is 
speeechless in denouncing its validity, even on con-
stitutional grounds. * * *" 
Another frequently cited case, St. Louis Public Service 
Co., a corp., v. The City of St. Louis, et al., (Mo.), 302 S. 
W. 2d 875, states the rule as follows: 
"The rule is well settled that one voluntarily 
proceeding under a statute or ordinance, and claim-
ing benefits thereby conferred, will not be heard to 
question its validity in order to avoid it~ bu.rde~~· 
The same or similar rules have been apphed m liti-
gation involving many different types of instru-
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tion used in referring to this rule or doctrine is ob-
viously unimportant. It is frequently called an es-
toppel. However, it is akin to the rule against as-
suming inconsistent positions and it involves the 
principles of waiver, election, and ratification 
rather, perhaps, than being limited to the precise 
principles of equitable estoppel. Regardless of the 
name or principle designated, the result is clearly 
the same. It precludes one who accepts the benefits 
from questioning the validity of the accompanying 
obligation. * * *" 
See also Neel v. Texas Liquor Control Board (Texas), 
259 S. W. 2d 312; Crittenden County v. McConnell (Ky.), 
36 S. W. 2d 627; American Board and Mortgage Company 
v. United States, 52 F. 2d 318; and Gregory v. Heeke, 
(Calif.), 238 Pac. 787. 
In Cotman v. Ousterhous, 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826, 
the court said : 
"Nor in any event, can the relator question the 
right of the dairy commissioner to cancel the license 
on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the act, 
and that his business was such that could not be 
constitutionally licensed. It is clear, indeed, that a 
person who obtains a license under a law, and seeks 
for a time to enjoy the benefits thereof, cannot af-
terward question the constitutionality of the act 
when the license is sought to be revoked. Minneap-
olis, St. P. & S., Ste. M. R. Co. v. Nester, 3 N. D. 
480, 47 N. W. 510; Hart v. Folsom, 70 H. H. 213, 47 
Atl. 603; State v. Seebold, 192 Mo. 720, 91 S. W. 
491; note in 19 Ann. Cas. 183." 
\Yhile it is true that in some instances the courts have 
not recognized the doctrine of estoppel on the basis that a 
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10 
person acquiring a license does not do so voluntarily be-
cause he would be severely penalized if he operated with-
out a license, such reasoning is not in accord with the facts 
of life today. At one time, few professions or occupations 
required a license, but today there is scarcely a trade or 
occupation, with any type of public interest, that isn't sub-
ject to licensing and regulation-lawyers, doctors, con-
tractors, architects, barbers, beauty parlors, and public util-
ities, just to name a few. It would be specious thinking to 
say that the acquisition of a license to engage in these busi-
nesses and occupations is the involuntary act of the appli-
cants. Today it is well recognized that most licensed busi-
nesses and occupations require certain qualifications or 
skills and that licensees receive benefits from being li-
censed. 
In the instant case, respondent maintains an incon-
sistent position. For years, respondent has enjoyed the 
benefits of the Motor Carrier Act, and while this very ac-
tion was pending, continued to seek additional authority to 
operate under the law. By virtue of the circumstances of 
this case, and the case law and texts heretofore cited, ap-
pellants submit that respondent is estopped to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Utah Motor Carrier Act. 
POINT II. 
A PARTY MAY NOT CLAIM THE INVALID-
ITY OF A STATUTE UNLESS SUCH PARTY 
IS HARMFULLY AFFECTED BY THE PAR-
TICULAR FEATURES OF THE STATUTE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
In 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, Constitutional Law, Sec-
tion 76, it is stated, in part: 
.. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a 
statute or other governmental action is to be con-
sidered in the light of the standing of the party who 
seeks to raise the question and of its particular ap-
plication. It is a firmly established principle of law 
that the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance 
may not be attacked by one whose rights are not, 
or are not about to be, adversely affected by the 
operation of the statute. This rule applies to all 
cases both at law and in equity, and is equally ap-
plicable in both civil and criminal proceedings. One 
of the many variations of this rule is the principle 
that one may not urge the unconstitutionality of a 
statute who is not harmfully affected by the partic-
ular feature of the statute alleged to be in conflict 
with the constitution." 
In this connection, see Tilleston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 
44; J<'tfrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571; 
State V. Heitz (Idaho), 238 Pac. (2d) 439; Pugh v. Pugh, 
1~4 N. \V. 959. 
In Bode, et al. v. Barrett, et al., 344 U. S. 583, 97 L. 
Ed. 567, the rule was stated as follows : 
"* * * Appellants make other arguments 
to the effect that the statute is so inconsistent, 
vague, and uncertain in its classification as to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But even if we assume that the vagar-
ies of the law reach that dignity, no showing is 
made that any of the appellants is the victim of an 
invidious classification." 
See also Utah Poll'er & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165. 
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In what way do the exemptions in the statutes harm 
respondent? Respondent may haul the cargoes exempted 
under Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, if 
it so desires. The only harm indicated by respondent is 
that it may be subject to penalties under the Public Utility 
Act, which Act is not before the court. It seems to appel-
lants that the Act would be meaningless if it couldn't be 
enforced. As stated before, this court settled the matter 
with respect to penalties against respondent in the case of 
Wycoff Company, Incorporated V. Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah, et al., supra. 
POINT III. 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 54-6-12, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, DO 
NOT DENY RESPONDENT DUE PROCESS 
OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. 
It is a well settled rule that when the constitutionality 
of an act of the Legislature is under consideration, there 
is a strong presumption that the act is constitutional. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated the rule as follows in the case 
of Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530: 
"In approaching the subject we have in mind 
the rule that when an act of the Legislature is at-
tacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the ques-
tion presented is not whether it is possible to con-
demn the act but whether it is possible to uphold 
it. The pres;n1ption is always in favor of validity, 
and legislative enactments must be sustained unless 
clearly in violation of fundamental law. Wadsworth 
v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161. Every 
presumption will be indulged in favor of legislation 
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and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of 
power will authorize judicial interference with leg-
islative action." 
It is also a well established rule that a person attacking 
the validity of a legislative enactment has the burden of 
substantiating his claim. The rule is stated as follows in 
11 Am. Jur. 796: 
"With regard to the duties cast upon the as-
sailant of a legislative enactment, the rule is fixed 
that a party who alleges the unconstitutionality of 
a statute normally has the burden of substantiating 
his claim and must overcome the strong presump-
tion in favor of its validity. It has been said that 
the party who wishes to pronounce a law unconsti-
tutional takes on himself the burden of proving this 
conclusion beyond all doubt, and that a party who 
asserts that the legislature has usurped power or 
has violated the Constitution must affirmatively and 
clearly establish his position. * * *" 
This court recognized the rule in Justice v. Standard Gil-
sonite Co., 12 Utah 357, 366 P. 2d 974, saying: 
"* * * We recognize as correct the rule as 
stated in 12 American Jurisprudence 216 and 217, 
Sec. 521, as follows : 
"'One who assails the classification in a law 
must carry the burden of showing that it does not 
rest on any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbi-
trary. * * * 
" '* * * Before a court can interfere with 
the legislative judgment, it must be able to say that 
there is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require with equal force its extension to others 
whom it leaves untouched. * * *' " 
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In this case, respondent assails the constitutionality of 
the Utah Motor Carrier Act and the Public Utilities Act, 
insofar as it relates to the regulation of motor carriers, on 
the basis that Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
exempts certain classes of motor vehicles from the need to 
obtain certificates of convenience and necessity and from 
complying with the tariff provision of the Utah Public Ser-
vice Commission, thereby violating Amendment XIV of the 
Constitution of the United States of America and Article I, 
Sections 2, 7 and 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
The court below limited its judgment to declaring Title 54, 
Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (the 
Motor Carrier Act), unconstitutional (R. 102). 
For the convenience of the court, Section 54-6-12, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, is set out below, with emphasis sup-
plied to mark the exemptions : 
"Except for the provisions of 54-6-17 relative 
to requirements of insurance, 54-6-21 relative to 
safety regulations, and 54-6-22 relative to accident 
report no portion of this act shall apply: 
" (a) To motor vehicles when engaged ex-
clusively in transporting students or their instruc-
tors to or from school or to or from school activities, 
the word 'school' to be construed to mean a place or 
structure in which the annual winter or summer 
elementary, collegiate, university or religious in-
struction is carried on; or 
" (b) To motor vehicles when used exclusively 
in carrying the United States mail under contract 
with the federal government; or 
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11 (c) To motor vehicles when the cargo con-
sists exclusively of livestock, farm, orchard, or dairy 
products which are being transported between farm, 
orchard or dairy and a market, warehouse, cream-
ery or processing plant; or exclusively of farm or 
dairy supplies used in or about the farm or dairy; 
or exclusively of coal, lumber or logs which are be-
ing transported from mine or forest to shipping 
point or market; or 
• 
11 (d) To motor vehicles when owned or oper-
ated by any duly organized agriculture cooperative 
association and used exclusively in the carrying on 
of its legally authorized nonprofit activities; or 
"(e) To motor vehicles used exclusively in the 
distribution of newspapers from the publisher to 
subscribers or distributors; or 
"(f) To motor vehicles when especially con-
structed for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or re-
pair purposes, and not otherwise used in transport-
ing goods and merchandise for compensation; or 
when constructed as armored cars and used for the 
safe conveyance or delivery of money or other valu-
ables, or when used as hearses, ambulances, or li-
censed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen mile 
radius of the ilmits of any city or town; or to motor 
vehicles used as ambulances or hearses by any per-
son, firm or corporation duly licensed in the state 
as an embalmer, funeral director, or as a mortuary 
establishment, provided that use of such motor ve-
hicles as an ambulance shall be incidental to the use 
of embalming or funeral directing. 
"(g) To a group of employees riding together 
in the automobile of a fellow employee to and from 
their employment and sharing the actual expenses 
of the transportation; provided that said group of 
employees shall not exceed 5 persons, in addition to 
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the driver of the vehicle, and in no event to exceed 
3 persons in any one seat, and provided further that 
this subsection shall not apply to any individual so 
operating in excess of one motor vehicle. 
"It shall be unlawful for any vehicle which is 
operated under any of said exempt classes to be 
operated upon the public highways of this state, for 
hire, without a public liability policy in an amount 
not less than $20,000.00 for personal injuries to or 
death of one person, or less than $40,000.80 for in-
juries to or death of more than one person; and for 
damage to property of any person other than the 
assured in an amount not less than $10,000.00 for 
liability arising out of the operation of said vehicle 
for hire; without maintaining said vehicle and all 
parts thereof in a safe condition at all times and 
without reporting every accident arising from or 
in connection with the operation of such vehicle as 
required by law or to be operated for any uses or 
purposes not falling within said exempt classes, ex-
cept in accordance with the provisions of this act. 
"The commission shall have power and author-
ity to prescribe such reasonable rules and regula-
tions to carry out the purposes of this act as may 
be deemed necessary including the establishing of 
reasonable fees for registration and each annual 
renewal thereof of exempt carriers and for the ser-
vices performed by the commission. 
"The commission is vested with power and 
authority and it shall be its duty to supervise and 
regulate all motor carriers as excepted above in ~c­
cordance with these rules and regulations and with 
the provisions of this section and all carriers now 
operating under the provisions of this sect~on sh.all 
make application to register their operatiOn With 
the public service commission on or before July 1, 
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19i>7, and thereafter each carrier commencing oper-
ations under this section shall apply for registra-
tion as provided herein within 30 days immediately 
after said operation. 
''A violation of this section or of the rules es-
tablished pursuant thereto shall constitute an un-
lawful act and shall be punishable in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as provided for in this 
act for non-exempt carriers." 
In examining the record of this case, we fail to find 
any evidence wherein the respondent has affirmatively 
demonstrated the unreasonableness of the exemptions pro-
vided for in Section 54-6-12, except, perhaps, the bald 
statement in his memorandum to the court below, which 
reads as follows : 
''What reasonable basis can exist to require 
general regulation of the transportation of sand 
and gravel, oil and ore, but exclude coal, lumber or 
logs; to regulate cancelled checks, but to exclude 
money and other valuables; to regulate trucks haul-
ing newspapers and any other commodity, but not 
if it is the exclusive item; and numerous other illus-
trations that the exclusionary provisions of Title 
54 readily bring to mind" (R. 54). 
The Legislature undoubtedly had good reasons for ex-
empting certain industries from general regulation. The 
laws of many states provide exemptions similar to those 
in the Utah law and the cases in which the exemptions have 
been considered by the courts amply illustrate the valid 
reasons for providing exemptions. In this connection, the 
court's attention is directed to the excellent annotation in 
109 A. L. R. 550. We submit that the respondent has not 
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met the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the un-
reasonableness of the exemptions in Section 54-6-12 by 
merely asking the question as to what reasonable basis can 
exist for the exemptions. 
Respondent, in his memorandum to the court below 
' states that he relies on the following authorities to sustain 
his contention that the Utah Motor Carrier Act is uncon-
stitutional: 
1. Newman v. Public Service Commission, Civil No. 
92815, decided by the Third District Court, State of Utah, 
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppsen, Judge, on February 26, 1953. 
2. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 75 L. Ed. 1264. 
3. Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 
366 P. 2d 974. 
InN ewman v. Public Service Commission, Judge Jepp-
son held unconstitutional the Utah Motor Carrier Act and 
the Public Utilities Act, insofar as its provisions relate to 
the regulation or control of motor carriers. The court's 
attention is called to the fact that this decision was made 
in 1953 and that several amendments to Section 54-6-12, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, have been made since the de-
cision. 
In the recent Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company 
case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the statute impos-
ing penalties on employers for failure to pay wages due 
separated employees within 24 hours from demand there-
for, was unconstitutional in its arbitrary exclusion of banks 
and mercantile houses from its provision. It is interesting 
to note that, although the court found the exemption of 
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banks and mercantile houses to be arbitrary, the decision 
was limited in its effect, the court saying: 
"* * * So we conclude that this classifica-
tion excluding banks and mercantile houses from 
the penalty provisons of this chapter is arbitrary 
and has no reasonable justification in fact. And 
that it is therefore unconstitutional to that extent.~' 
It is the contention of appellant that, while the prob-
lem before the court is similar to the Justice v. Standard 
Gilson'ite case, the purpose of the act and the facts involved 
in that case were quite different; furthermore there is no 
showing or evidence herein that the Legislature was arbi-
trary in excluding the operations named in the statute pres-
ently under consideration. 
The Smith v. Cahoon case, relied upon by respondent 
in the court below, was decided by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1931, and held the Florida Act regulating 
motor carriers unconstitutional. Since that time it has been 
the subject of critical examination in several decisions. The 
facts of the case are that the appellant was a carrier for 
hire who was arrested for operating without having ob-
tained a certificate of convenience and necessity or having 
paid the tax required by the laws of Florida. The statutes 
provided that every auto transportation company must 
obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity, a bond 
or insurance policy must be given for protection of freight 
carried and the public which might be injured through 
negligent operation, and a mileage tax paid. From these 
provisions, the statutes exempted certain carriers as fol-
lows: 
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"* * * Provided, that the term 'auto trans-
portation company' as used in this act shall not in-
clude corporations or persons engaged exclusively 
in the transportation of children to or from school 
' * * * in the transporting agricultural, horticul-
tural, dairy, or other farm products and fresh and 
salt fish and oysters and shrimp from the point of 
production to the assembling or shipping point en-
route to primary market, * * * in transport-
ing or delivering dairy products or any transporta-
tion company engaged in operating taxicabs, or ho-
tel busses from a depot to a hotel in the same town 
or city." 
The facts in the instant case are distinguishable from 
those in Smith v. Cahoon in that here the appellant holds a 
certificate of convenience and necessity, and the Utah law 
does not exempt any class of persons from the requirements 
under the Motor Carrier Act relating to insurance, safety 
regulations or accident reports. Also, the Utah Motor Car-
rier Act does not discriminate by imposing a mileage tax 
on those having a certificate of convenience and necessity. 
In its Smith v. Cahoon decision, the court said: 
"* * * In the present instance, the regula-
tion as to the giving of a bond or insurance policy 
to protect the public generally, in order to be sus-
tained, must be deemed to relate to the public safety. 
This is a matter of grave concern as the highways 
become increasingly crowded with motor vehicles, 
and we entertain no doubt of the power of the state 
to insist upon suitable protection for the public 
against injuries through the operations on its high-
ways of carriers for hire, whether they are common 
carriers or private carriers. But in establishing 
such a regulation, there does not appear to be the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
slightest justification for making a distinction be-
tween those who carry for hire farm products, or 
milk or butter, or fish or oysters, and those who 
carry for hire bread or sugar, or tea or coffee, or 
groceries in general, or other useful commodities. 
So far as the statute was designed to safeguard the 
public with respect to the use of the highways, we 
think that the discrimination it makes between the 
private carriers which are relieved of the necessity 
of obtaining certificates and giving security, and a 
carrier such as the appellant, was wholly arbitrary 
and constituted a violation of the appellant's con-
stitutional right. 'Such a classification is not based 
on anything having relation to the purpose for 
which it is made.' * * *" 
It is to be noted that in the first part of the above 
statement, the court found that there was no valid reason 
for distinguishing between classes of carriers with respect 
to the requirement of a bond or insurance policy for the 
protection of the public. Under the Utah law, no carrier 
for hire is exempted from the insurance policy require-
ments. 
As to the latter part of the above statement, the court 
said that the statute was designed to protect the use of the 
highways and that the exemption of private carriers was 
arbitrary. It appears that the Utah Legislature had a 
broader purpose in mind when it enacted the Utah Motor 
Carrier Act than is indicated by the Florida statutes quoted 
in Smith v. Cahoon. For example, Section 54-6-4, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"The commission is vested with power and au-
thority, * * * to regulate the facilities, ac-
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counts, service and safety of operations of each 
common motor carrier, to regulate operating and 
time schedules so as to meet the needs of any com-
munity, and so as to insure adequate transportation 
service to the territory traversed by such common 
motor carriers, and so as to prevent unnecessary 
duplication of service between these common motor 
carriers, and between them and the lines of compet-
ing steam and electric railroads; and the commission 
may require the coordination of the service and 
schedules of competing common carriers by motor 
vehicles or electric and steam railroads; * * * " 
And Section 54-6-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"* * * the commission shall take into con-
sideration the financial ability of the applicant to 
properly perform the service sought under the cer-
tificate and also the character of the highway over 
which said common motor carrier proposes to oper-
ate and the effect thereon, and upon the traveling 
public using the same, and also the existing trans-
portation facilities in the territory proposed to be 
served. * * *" 
And, with respect to contract carriers, Section 54-6-8, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"* * * If, * * * the commission shall 
determine that the highways over which the appli-
cant desires to operate are not unduly burdened; 
that the granting of the application will not unduly 
interfere with the traveling public; and that the 
granting of the application will not be detrimental 
to the best interests of the people of the state of 
Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and if 
the existing transportation facilities do not provide 
adequate or reasonable service, the commission shall 
grant such permit." 
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From the foregoing, it can be seen that the Legislature 
had much more in mind than merely the protection of the 
highways and requiring a bond or insurance for the safety 
of the public, and it may well have had these other factors 
in mind whe-n it exempted certain carriers from some por-
tions of the Motor Carrier Act. 
It is also of no small consequence that Smith v. Ca-
hoon has been the subject of critical examination in more 
recent decisions. In the 1935 Wyoming decision of Public 
Sl'rl'ire Commission of JVyoming v. W. C. Grimshaw, 53 
P. 2d l, 109 A. L. R. 534, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
said of the Smith v. Cahoon decision : 
"The decision of Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 
553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. Ed. 1264, relied upon by 
the defendant, has had its legal effect repeatedly re-
viewed by the above cited later cases from the court 
from which it emanated. See especially Aero May-
/loH•er T1·ansit Company v. Georgia Public Service 
Commission, supra. In view of its subsequent inter-
pretation by the national Supreme Court, we are 
obliged to conclude that it cannot be regarded as 
applicable here." 
The United States Supreme Court in Aero Mayflower 
T1·ans£t Company v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 
295 U. S. :285, 79 L. Ed. 1439, analyzed Smith v. Cahoon as 
follows: 
"Smith v. Cahoon has been considered in later 
cases in this court, and the limits of its holding, 
clear enough at the beginning, have been brought 
out in sharp relief. Thus, in Continental Baking 
Co. v. Woodring, supra (286 U. S. 371, 76 L. Ed. 
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1166, 52 S. Ct. 595, 81 A. L. R. 1402) which came 
here from the State of Kansas, exemption from var-
ious forms of regulation, including the payment of 
a tax, was accorded to 'the transportation of live-
stock and farm products to market by the owner 
thereof or supplies for his own use in his own mo-
tor vehicle.' The exemption was upheld. Again, in 
Hicklin V. Coney, supra (290 U. S. 175, 78 L. Ed. 
251, 54 S. Ct. 142) a statute of South Carolina gave 
exemption to 'farmers or dairymen, hauling dairy 
or farm products; or lumber haulers engaged in 
transporting lumber or logs from the forests to be 
shipping points.' The exemption was interpreted by 
the highest court of the state as limited to cases 
where the hauling was irregular or occasional and 
not as a regular business. We upheld the statute as 
thus interpreted though the effect was to relieve 
from the filing of a bond. 
"These cases and others like them (American 
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 45 L. Ed. 
102, 21 S. Ct. 43) are illustrations of the familiar 
doctrine that a legislature has a wide discretion in 
the classification of trades and occupations for the 
purpose of taxation and in the allowance of exemp-
tions and deductions within reasonable limits. Bell's 
Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 33 L. Ed. 
892, 10 S. Ct. 53; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 
U. S. 114, 125, 54 L. Ed. 688, 694, 30 S. Ct. 496; 
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 572, 
54 L. Ed. 883, 30 S. Ct. 578; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 
U. S. 137, 142, 69 L. Ed. 884, 888, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44 
A. L. R. 1454; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 
146, 159, 7 4 L. Ed. 775, 781, 50 S. Ct. 310; State 
Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. Ed. 
1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A. L. R. 1464, 75 A. L. R. 
1536." 
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Refl•rt>ncc to cases in which Smith v. Cahoon has been 
l'Onsidered indicates the restricted scope of that holding 
and its inapplicability to the instant case. In the case of 
Rail1cay Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 93 
L. Ed. 533, the Supreme Court of the United States con-
sidered the constitutionality of a city regulation prohibit-
ing advertising vehicles in city streets but permitting busi-
ness notices upon business delivery vehicles under certain 
specified conditions. In answering attacks upon the consti-
tutionality of the ordinance, the court stated : 
''* * * We do not sit to weigh evidence on 
the due process issue in order to determine whether 
the regulation is sound or appropiate; nor is it our 
function to pass judgment on its wisdom. See Olsen 
v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 85 L. Ed. 1305, 61 S. 
Ct. 862, 133 A. L. R. 1500. We would be trespassing 
on one of the most intensely local and specialized 
of all municipal problems if we held that this regu-
lation had no relation to the traffic problem of New 
York City. It is the judgment of the local authori-
ties that it does have such a relation. And nothing 
has been advanced which shows that to be palpably 
false. 
"* * * 
"We cannot say that that judgment is not an 
allowable one. Yet if it is, the classification has 
relation to the purpose for which it is made and 
does not contain the kind of discrimination against 
which the Equal Protection Clause affords protec-
tion. It is by such practical considerations based on 
experience rather than by theoretical inconsisten-
cies that the question of equal protection is to be 
answered. * * * And the fact that New York 
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City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of 
distraction but does not touch what may be even 
greater ones in a different category, such as the 
vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It 
is no requirement of equal protection that all evils 
of the same genius be eradicated or none at all. 
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 
160, 57 L. Ed. 164, 169, 33 S. Ct. 66." 
Recent expressions of the United States Supreme 
Court, dealing with the question of classifications under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
include the Sunday Closing Law decisions: McGowan v. 
Maryland, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393; Braunfeld v. Brown, 6 L. Ed. 
2d 563; Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, 6 L. Ed. 
2d 536; and Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. 
McGinley, 6 L. Ed. 2d 551. In the 1961 McGowan case, the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in sustaining the clas· 
sifications under the Sunday Closing Law in question, 
stated as follows : 
"* * * Although no precise formula has 
been developed, the Court has held that the Four· 
teenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope 
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some 
groups of citizens differently than others. The con-
stitutional safeguard is offended only if the classi-
fication rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the 
achievement of the State's objective. State legisla-
tures are presumed to have acted within their con-
stitutional power despite the fact that in practice, 
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. See 
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comrs., 330 U. 
S. 552, 91 L. Ed. 1093, 67 S. Ct. 910; Metropolitan 
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Casuality Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. 
Ed. 1070, 5i> S. Ct. 538; Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 51 L. Ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 
337, Ann. Cas. 1912C 160; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. Ed. 909, 19 S. 
Ct. 609." 
The separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined 
by Mr. Justice Harlan in the McGowan decision, and all 
of tht• other aforementioned Sunday Closing Law cases, 
reads in part: 
"* * * The restricted scope of this Court's 
review of state regulatory legislation under the 
Equal Protection Clause is of long standing. Linds-
ley v. Natural Carbon-ic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78, 
79, 55 L. Ed. 369, 377, 378, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 
1912C 160. The applicable principles are that a 
state statute may not be struck down as offensive 
of equal protection in its schemes of classification 
unless it is obviously arbitrary, and that, except in 
the case of a statute whose discriminations are so 
patently without reason that no conceivable situa-
tion of fact could be found to justify them, the 
claimant who challenges the statute bears the bur-
den of affirmative demonstration that in the actual 
state of facts which surround its operation, its clas-
sification lacks rationality." 
In addition to the Aero Mayflower Transit Company 
V. Georgia Public Sen·ice Commission case, supra, see the 
ft)llowing cases pertaining to exemptions in the transpor-
tation of livestock, dail·y, agricultural, and horticultural 
products: Hicl.·lin v. Covey, 290 U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247; 
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. 
Ed. 1155: Bushnell v. People. 92 Colo. 174, 19 P. 2d 197; 
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Schwartzman Service v. Stahl, 60 F. 2d 1034; Riley v. Law-
son, 106 Fla. 521, 143 So. 619; State v. King, (Maine), 188 
A. 775; Ex Parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. 2d 284; 
Figenshaw V. McCoy, (N. D.), 265 N. W. 259; Wisconsin 
Allied Truck Owners' Assoc. V. Public Service Commission, 
207 Wis. 664, 242 N. W. 668. 
With respect to the constitutionality of the exemptions 
contained in Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
the court's attention is directed to the complete annotation 
on this subject in 109 American Law Reports, Annotated, 
550. Beginning on page 570, the annotation specifically 
reviews most of the exemptions found in the Utah law. 
These exemptions are traditional and most of them can be 
found in the Interstate Commerce Act and in comparable 
acts of almost every state in the Union. 
Subsection (a) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, exempts motor vehicles engaged in transporting 
students or their instructors to or from school or school 
activities from the Motor Carrier Act. In Continental Bak-
ing Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. Ed. 1155, the 
United States Supreme Court sustained the constitution-
ality of a similar exemption, saying: 
"The fourth exemption is 'of transportation of 
children to and from school.' The distinct public 
interest in this sort of transportation affords suf-
ficient reason for the classification. The State was 
not bound to seek revenue for its highways from 
that source, and, without violating appellants' con-
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stiutional rights, could avail itself of other means 
of assuring safety in that class of cases." 
See Ex Parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. 2d 284; 
Riley v. Lawson, 106 Fla. 521, 143 So. 619; Kelly v. Finney, 
:!07 Ind. 557, 194 N. E. 157. 
Subsection (b) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, exempts motor vehicles engaged in carrying 
mail under contract with the federal government from cer-
tain provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. This type of ex-
emption has been held constitutional in a number of cases. 
In Kelly v. Finney, supra, the court said: 
"The exemption contained in subsection (b) of 
section 2, which exempts motor vehicles used ex-
clusively in carrying United States mail, is also 
affected with the public interest, and can be sus-
tained upon the same principles as the transporta-
tion of school children, and for that reason the clas-
sification is not invalid." 
Also see Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. 
Grimshan•, supra. 
Subsection (c) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, exempts from certain provisions of the Utah 
l\Iotor Carrier Act motor vehicles when the cargo consists 
exclusively of livestock, farm, orchard, or dairy products 
which are being transported between farm, orchard or 
dairy and a market, warehouse, creamery or processing 
plant; or exclusively of farm or dairy supplies used in or 
about the farm or dairy; or exclusively of coal, lumber or 
logs which are being transported from mine or forest to 
shipping point or market. 
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Attention is directed to the limitation imposed on the 
transportation of the products named in Subsection (c), 
above. Such products may not be transported just any 
place the carrier desires. 
In Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Ser-
vice Commission, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
sustained the exemption of transportation of agricultural 
or dairy products under a statute which provided whether 
the "vehicle is owned by the owner or producer of such 
agricultural or dairy products or not, so long as the title 
remains in the producer." The court, in its opinion, quoted 
from an earlier Georgia case, Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 
67 4, 169 S. E. 22, as follows: 
"* * * Many of the farm products must be 
brought from remote sections unaccommodated by 
the better system of roads-in some cases not even 
by a public road. * * *" 
In Schwartzman Service, Inc., v. Stahl, et al., (Mo. 
1932), 60 F. 2d 1034, the District Court, Western District 
of Missouri, upheld an exemption similar to that in the Utah 
law, saying: 
"It must be conceded that the interest of the 
public is involved in the gathering and marketing 
of farm products as speedily and economically as 
possible. The Legislature no doubt had in mind the 
facts, the same as have been made to appear to us, 
that the only use made by trucks within the exemp-
tion would be in gathering the products of the 
farmer and transporting them to the nearest ship-
ping point. 
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"Necessarily, this would not involve an exten-
sive use of the highways. In a few instances, 
no doubt the farmer would live on the state owned 
and controlled highway, but in most instances this 
would not be true. In the majority of cases the 
farmers first reach the state highways at the place 
of marketing their products. In such cases they 
would not use state highways at all. The highways 
would not be used by the farmer in marketing his 
product as much as the contract hauler and motor 
carrier would use the same highways within cities 
and suburban zones. Moreover long hauls could not 
be economically made under this exemption. The 
motor vehicle employed must return empty, as farm 
products could not be hauled both ways to market. 
Again, large heavy trucks could not be used in gath-
ering farm products. Much of the time such trucks 
would be off of hard surfaced roads. 
"Plaintiff relies upon the late case of Smith v. 
Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 587, 75 L. Ed. 
1264. While the exemption in that case was in lan-
guage very similar to the language in the case at 
bar, yet it contained this broad exemption, 'or to 
motor vehicles used exclusively in transporting or 
delivering dairy products.' 
"It will be observed that this might involve 
long hauls over the highways and does not restrict 
deliveries merely for shipping purposes. The same 
could be used for hauling both ways." 
Also see Figensha'W v. McCoy (N. D.), 265 N. W. 259; 
State ex rel. Wisconsin All-ied Truck O'Wners' Assoc. v. Pub-
lic Sen·ice Commission. 207 \Vis. 664, 242 N. W. 668; Riley 
v. Lau·sMz. supra. 
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With regard to the exemption for the transportation 
of coal, lumber or logs, it is to be noted that such transpor-
tation is restricted to hauling from the mine or forest to 
the shipping point or market. The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon sustained a similar exemption for the transportation 
of logs, poles, piling or rough timber in the case of Ander-
son v. Thomas, Commissioner of Public Utilities, 26 P. 2d 
60, 75, saying: 
"* * * The lumbering business is one of the 
principal industries of the state, on which a large 
part of the population is dependent, and the state 
is interested in encouraging and developing this in-
dustry. Moreover, the commodity which is carried 
by the special carrier might not, in the opinion of 
the Legislature, be able to bear so large a tax as 
commodities ordinarily carried by the contract 
hauler." 
Also see State v. King, supra; Hicklin v. Covey, 290 
U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247, 54 S. Ct. 142. 
The transportation of coal from the mine to shipping 
point or market would be analogous to the hauling of logs 
and agricultural products. The mines are usually not lo-
cated adjacent to state highways, so that use of such high-
ways is limited. It is also suggested that, in conjunction 
with this, the Legislature may have considered the eco-
nomic importance of the coal industry to certain areas of 
our state and felt that its regulation to the same extent as 
other carriers would not be in the public interest. 
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Subsection (d) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Anno-
takd 1953. exempts vehicles operated by agricultural coop-
erative associations in their nonprofit activities. 
In 1\.elly v. Finn('y, supra, the court held constitutional 
a statute which exempted from the act regulating motor 
rarriers '' * * * vehicles transporting livestock, farm 
or dairy products or supplies from or to farm or dairy or 
from point of production to market warehouse, creamery 
or other original place of storage, or to or from any distri-
bution depot owned, operated or controlled by any non-
profit cooperative association when vehicle (is) owned, 
lt'ased or operated by a non-profit cooperative association 
(and/or) when transporting property of the association or, 
of any of its members, * * *." The court said : 
"* * * The Legislature knew that the use 
of the state highways for the transportation of live-
stock or farm or dairy products, etc., coming within 
the exemption is relatively small and incidental, and 
is also affected with a general public interest, and 
such classification, we think, is entirely permissible. 
* * *" 
And, in Baker v. Glenn, State Tax Commission of Ken-
tucky (1933 D. C.), 2 F. Supp. 880, the court considered an 
exemption for motor vehicles owned or leased by a non-
profit, cooperative association, from an act regulating motor 
transportation, concluding: 
"* * * The article in question provides that 
a motor vehicle owned or leased by a nonprofit, co-
operative, association, and carrying only property 
belonging to the association or its members, 'shall 
be considered to be an owner's truck,' as in fact it 
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seems to us, in a very true sense, to be. These as-
sociations are really a banding together of numer-
ous individuals engaged in the same business for 
their common good. The enterprise is a joint one, 
usually limited to the producers of agricultural prod-
ucts. The analogy between transportation by such 
associations, and the transportation by a farmer of 
his own livestock and farm products to market, is 
so close, both in respect of frequency and character 
of use, as to make applicable, we think, the distinc-
tion stated in Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 
supra, at pages 371, 372, :373, of 286 U. S., 52 S. 
Ct. 595. * * *" 
Subsection (e) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, exempts motor vehicles used exclusively in the 
transportation of newspapers from the publisher to sub-
scribers or distributors. 
The basis for upholding the exemption for the trans-
portation of newspapers was well stated by the Supreme 
Court of Indiana in Kelly v. Finney, et al., supra, as fol-
lows: 
"Subsection (e) of section 2 exempts motor 
vehicles used exclusively in the transportation of 
newspapers from the publisher to the subscriber or 
distributor. Here again the public interest is in-
volved. Newspapers are read almost universally, 
and form a very important part of our educational 
and business life. The general public is interested 
in rapid, frequent and cheap distribution of news-
papers. No other type of transportation under mod-
ern and present day conditions would suffice, and 
the exemption of such transportation could well be 
made by legislative enactment in aid of this general 
public policy." 
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Also see SchwaTtzman Service v. Stahl, supra; State 
v. J\ing, supra. 
Subsections (f) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Anno-
talt1d 1953, exempts from the Utah Motor Carrier Act ve-
hicleg constructed for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or 
repair purp<lSt>s; armored cars; hearses, ambulances, or li-
cen~L'd taxicabs operating within a fifteen mile radius of 
a city or town; and vehicles used incidentally as ambulances 
or hearses by a licensed embalmer, funeral director or 
mortuary. 
The Legislature, no doubt, felt that the public welfare 
would be better served by exempting these special type ve-
hicles from a portion of the regulations imposed on other 
motor carriers. 
Attention is directed to the Nevada case of Ex Parte 
lratacable, supra, in which several similar exemptions were 
considered. The court said : 
"The first class of motor vehicle claimed to be 
exempted under the statute, * * * are hearses. 
* * * \V e must presume that the Legislature 
knew that cemeteries adjacent to cities are reached 
by traversing chiefly streets and highways not em-
braced in the public highway system, and that the 
use of public highways by hearses is rare; whereas, 
this petitioner, comparatively speaking, to use the 
language in Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 
supra, uses daily upon the public highways a fleet 
of trucks in the conduct of their businesses. 
"The next class * * * are ambulances. 
Again we think the Legislature must be presumed 
to know that of our 90,000 population approximately 
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70,000 reside in the towns and cities exceeding 400 
in population, where the hospitals are located, not 
requiring the use of the public highways to reach 
them, and that the population scattered in the re-
mote regions without telephone connections can take 
an injured person to a hospital in the same length 
of time it would take to go for an ambulance. * * * 
"* * * 
"The next class * * * are city licensed 
taxicabs operating within a ten-mile limit of a city 
or town. * * * the land two or three mlies be-
yond the city limits of substantially all the cities 
and towns is arid and overgrown with sagebrush, 
that the population beyond such a point is scattered, 
and that the calls for taxicabs out to such localities 
are rare; and, furthermore, that beyond the city 
limits, in many instances, roads lead from such city 
which are not a part of the public highway system, 
* * *. They have a right, too, to take into con-
sideration the fact that taxicabs are light and do 
practically no damage to the public highways, while, 
on the other hand, the trucks to which are often at-
tached heavy trailers, are in constant use and do a 
great deal of damage thereto." 
In Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, supra, at page 
1165 in 76 L. Ed., the court held that it was within the 
broad discretion of the Legislature to exempt motor vehicles 
operating within a radius of twenty-five miles from the 
city in which their operations were carried on. 
Also see Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss, 199 Cal. 
21, 248 Pac. 235. 
Subsection (g) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, exempts employees riding together to and from 
work and sharing transportation expenses. 
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Obviously this exemption is in the public interest. 
Workers frequently live long distances from their place 
of trnployment and public transportation is not always 
availabl('. The effect of this exemption would actually be to 
reduce traffic on the highways. Also, the expenses shared 
must be actual expenses, and no individual may operate 
more than one vehicle under the provisions of this statute, 
so this is not a profit making type of operation. 
In conclusion, appellants contend that there is a rea-
sonable basis for the exemptions in the Utah Motor Carrier 
Act, and that similar classifications considered by other 
courts, both federal and state, have consistently been held 
constitutional. The Utah law appears to be more restrictive 
than similar laws in some of the other states in that it does 
not completely exempt any carriers from the law. Those 
that are exempted are still required to comply with the 
insurance provisions of the act, the safety regulations, and 
the accident reporting provisions. Furthermore, Section 
:14-6-12 provides that the Public Service Commission may 
prescribe reasonable rules to carry out the provisions of 
the act, including the establishment of reasonable fees for 
registration and services performed by the Commission. 
Exempt carriers are also subject to the penalty provisions 
of the ~Iotor Carrier Act. 
It appears, therefore, that the exemptions are con-
sistent with the purposes of the Utah Motor Carrier Act. 
In many states the acts regulating motor transportation 
provide for taxes for the maintenance of the public high-
ways. This is not so in the Utah law. Here the objective 
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is to regulate motor transportation so that the highways 
and traveling public will be protected, that adequate ser-
vice will be provided, that reasonable fares will be charged, 
and that existing transportation facilities will not be un-
duly interfered with. Exempt carriers are not relieved of 
the burden of paying their fair share of highway costs, but 
rather, the Legislature, in what it believed to be in the 
best interests of the public, relieved them of a portion of 
the duties placed on motor carriers. The motor carriers 
falling within the exemptions in Section 54-6-12 are en-
gaged in types of business distinct and different from those 
not exempted, and the exemptions were reasonably calcu-
lated to carry out the objectives of the Utah Motor Carrier 
Act. As this court said, in Thomas v. Daughters of the 
Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 Pac. (2d) 477, 499: 
"* * * If by any fair interpretation of the 
statute the legislation can be upheld, it is the duty 
of this court to sustain it, even though judges may 
view the act as inopportune or unwise; and it is not 
within the province of the judiciary to question the 
wisdom or the motives of the Legislature in the 
enactment of a statute." 
POINT IV. 
A FINDING THAT A PORTION OF THE UTAH 
MOTOR CARRIER ACT IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL DOES NOT RENDER THE ENTIRE 
ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
This court has long recognized the rule that a portion 
of a statute may be found unconstitutional without affect-
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ing the constitutionality of the remainder of the statute. 
State v. Lf'dkins, 5 Utah 2d 422, 303 P. 2d 1099; North 
Tintic Mining Co. v. Crockett, 75 Utah 259, 284 Pac. 328; 
Statr ex rd. Shields v. Barke1·, 50 Utah 189, 167 Pac. 262; 
Tygesf'n v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127; 
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 106 Utah 
55, Ufl P. 2d 503. The rule summarized, as follows, in 
Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P. 2d 190: 
"Severability or separability where part of a 
statute is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of 
legislative intent. The test fundamentally is whether 
the legislature would have passed the statute with-
out the objectionable part, and whether or not the 
parts are so dependent upon each other that the 
court should conclude the intention was that the 
statute be effective only in its entirety. * * * 
Frequently the courts are aided in the determination 
of legislative intent by the inclusion within a stat-
ute of a 'saving clause.' * * *" 
This cout·t has also said that a savings clause creates 
a presumption of separability, but such a presumption is 
not controlling if it is recognizable that the Legislature 
would not have enacted the remaining provisions alone, 
or that standing alone they would not provide for an oper-
ative whole. State v. Roberts, 92 Utah 204, 66 P. 2d 892, In 
tf Kt~sler, (D. C. Utah), 187 F. Supp. 277. 
There is nothing in the record of the case before the 
cout't showing the intention of the Legislature with respect 
to the exemptions in Section 54-6-12. However, on pages 21 
and 22 of this brief there is set forth portions of the statutes 
which indicate the broad purposes of the Utah Motor Car-
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rier Act. The intention of the Legislature is further shown 
by the savings clause contained in Section 25 of Chapter 
65, Laws of Utah 1935, which set up the Utah Motor Car-
ier Act in its present form, although some provisions have 
since been amended. Said Section 25 reads as follows: 
"If any part or parts of this act shall be held to 
be constitutional, such decision shall not affect the 
validity of the remaining parts of this act. The leg-
islature hereby declares that it would have passed 
the remaining parts of this act even if it had known 
that such part or parts thereof would be declared 
unconstitutional.'' 
The court below held the entire Utah Motor Carrier 
Act unconstitutional on the basis that the exemptions in 
Section 54-6-12 violated the provisions of both the State 
and Federal Constitutions. It is our contention, however, 
that even if this section should be found to be unconstitu-
tional, the remainder of the Act should not fall. The legis-
lature stated its intention in this regard in the savings 
clause quoted above. Furthermore, the basic objectives of 
the Act would remain intact. The unconstitutionality of 
Section 54-6-12 would not render the remainder of the Act 
inoperative. While the Legislature undoubtedly intended, 
in the public interest, to relieve the exempt motor carriers 
from some of the regulations and obligations imposed on 
others, it is certainly questionable that the Legislature 
would not have enacted the Motor Carrier Act and would 
have let all motor carriers go unregulated simply because 
certain classes couldn't be exempted. 
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Appellants have cited cases in this brief in which 
nearly all of the exemptions provided in Section 54-6-12 
have been held constitutional by other courts. It is ap-
pellants' further contention, however, that if there is a por-
tion of Section G·i-6-12 that is invalid, not all of that section 
need be unconstitutional. In volume 2 of Sutherland, Stat-
ltfory Construction, page 195, it is stated: 
"Recognition of a third separability situation in 
which a single section of a statute contains the lan-
guage susceptible of applications, part of which are 
invalid, is important as the statute should be up-
held even in the stricter jurisdictions, if, after the 
physical deletion of the offending section, a work-
able statute, reasonably conforming to legislative in-
tent, remains. * * *" 
In the case of Fm·mers' Loan and Trust Co. v. New 
York Cent. R. R., 134 Misc. 778, 236 N. Y. Supp. 250, the 
court said: 
"Where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, 
that fact does not authorize the courts to declare 
the remainder void, unless the provisions are so 
connected together in subject-matter, meaning, or 
purpose, that it cannot be presumed the Legislature 
would have passed one without the other. * * * 
If the remaining provision is complete in itself and 
capable and being executed in accordance with the 
apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of 
that which was rejected, it must be sustained. 
* * * 
'·Even where a single section attempts or pur-
ports to cover two entirely distinct and separable 
classes of cases, one properly and the other improp-
erly, it may be upheld as to the class which consti-
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tutionally may be thus covered, even though con-
demned as to the other. Dollar Co. v. Canadian Car 
& Foundry Co., 220 N. Y. 270, 278, 115 N. E. 711. 
In such a case, the statute can be held entirely void 
only where it is evident from a contemplation of the 
statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it 
that it would not have been passed at all, except as 
an entirety, and that the general purpose of the 
Legislature will be defeated if it shall be held valid 
as to some cases and void as to others. * * * 
The principle governing division is not a principle 
of form. It is a principle of function. The question 
in every case is whether the Legislature, if partial 
invalidity had been foreseen, would have wished the 
statute to be enforced with the invalid part ex-
scinded, or rejected altogether. * * *" 
The court's attention is directed to the case of Justice 
v. Standard Gilsonite Company, supra, in which it held only 
the exclusionary provisions of the Utah statute relating to 
banks and mercantile houses unconstitutional, saying: 
"* * * so we conclude that this classifica-
tion excluding banks and mercantile houses from 
the penalty provisions of this chapter is arbitrary 
and has no reasonable justification in fact and it 
is, therefore, unconstitutional to that extent." 
Respondents contend that if the exemptions contained 
in Section 54-6-12 are found to be arbitrary and discrimina· 
tory the entire Motor Carrier Act must fall. It is the posi-
tion of appellants, in view of the foregoing cases and text 
citations, that even if Section 54-6-12 should be found un· 
constitutional, said section is completely severable and the 
remainder of the Act should rest undisturbed. Also, ap-
pelants maintain that, while there has been no showing to 
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date that any particular class exemption under Section 
r)4-6-l~ violates the state or federal constitutional provi-
sit~ns. if any particular exemption or exemptions are found 
invalid, not all of Section 54-6-12 need be unconstitutional. 
It is clear, in this situation, that the Legislature would 
have passed the Act without all of the exemptions now con-
tained in Section 54-6-12, as this section has been amended 
spwral times. For example, prior to the 1945 amendment 
(Chapter 105, Laws of Utah 1945), contract carriers oper-
ating within 15 miles of the corporate limits of a city or 
town were exempt; the 1948 amendment (Chapter 8, Laws 
of Utah 1948 First Special Session) added what is now 
subst•dion (g). exempting employees riding together; the 
19:-)7 amendment (Chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1957) added 
the paragraphs relating to insurance on, and regulation of, 
exempt carriers; the 1961 amendment (Chapter 125, Laws 
of Utah 1961) added the hauling of coal to the exempt 
classes. 
In summary, it is the position of appellants that Sec-
tion 54-6-12 is severable from the other provisions of the 
Utah Jlntor Carrier Act, and if the court should find that 
Sedion i)-l-6-12 violates the constitutional provisions com-
plained of, the remainder of the Act should stand. Fur-
thermore, if the court should find that any specific exemp-
tion in Section 5-!-6-12 is unconstitutional, the remaining 
portions of said section should rest undisturbed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent comes before the court in an inconsistent 
position. It holds certificates of convenience and necessity, 
and during the pendency of this case has applied for ad-
ditional authority. For years respondent has enjoyed, and 
still does enjoy, the benefits of regulation under the Motor 
Carrier Act, and, therefore, is estopped from challenging 
the constitutionality of said Act. 
The exemptions which respondent claims are repug-
nant to the Federal and State Constitutions are similar to 
those found in Federal and State laws throughout the na-
tion and have been regularly upheld in the courts. 
Appellants maintain that the Motor Carrier Act is 
constitutional and consistent with public policy and respect-
fully request this court to reverse the judgment of the 
court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
H. WRIGHT VOLKER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
KEITH E. SOHM, 
Commerce Attorney, 
Attorneys for Appelktnts. 
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